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Quartermaster Aerial Supply in Korea, Supporting U.N. Ground
Troops The 2348th Quartermaster Airborne Air Supply & Packaging Detachment (redesignated later as the 8081st) is the only unit of its kind in the Army. Among the many Support assignments it has drawn in the Korean conflict was an airdrop of more than 1,500 tons of supplies to the Marines in the Chosin Reservoir area. During this operation Captain Hospelhorn’s airborne Quartermasters dropped eight sections of treadway bridge, thus saving the Marines from traversing thirty-five miles of enemy-infested hills. Another of its assignments was the supply-drop in support of the 187th Airborne RCT in the Sukehon-Sonchon area north of Seoul. The Marines needed a 35,000 pound bridge; the Airborne Combat Team needed jeeps and 105-mm. howitzers; the 24th Infantry Division needed whole blood and ammunition; the Navy needed rope and wire. The Quartermaster Aerial Supply Company prepared these items and thousands more for parachute drop. We loaded them in airplanes and we ejected them for pinpoint landing in Korea. The 2348th QM Airborne Air Supply and Packaging Detachment was organized by The Quartermaster General in recognition of the need for emergency aerial resupply to combat troops in the Far East Command and to support Airborne operations in that theater. Activation was accomplished on the 31st of July 1950, at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the unit, with an authorized strength of five officers, one warrant officer, and eighty enlisted men, departed on August 14th, arriving at an Air Base in southern Japan on September 4th. This Quartermaster unit was assigned the mission of receiving and temporarily storing all classes of supplies which may be required for aerial resupply from all branches of the service; to prepare such supplies for air-drop; to assist in outloading Airborne units; to supervise the loading and tying down of equipment and other cargo in both the air-drop and air-lauded phases (Later amended to eliminate air-landed.) ; and, in the air-drop phase, to furnish personnel for the ejection of the cargo from the aircraft in flight. At the time of our arrival the Air Force Base was being used as a General Depot in support of the airdrop and air-landed effort in the Korean area. This Depot was operated by the Air Transportability Training Center, which had operational responsibility for supplying personnel for both phases of aerial resupply. The ATTC Unit was originally formed from a nucleus of 11th Airborne Division personnel left in the theater in 1949 for the purpose of providing instructors in the air transportability schools. Their function was to train the various divisions in Japan in the air transporting of all their combat equipment. The Airborne Infantry Officer in command of the ATTC also commanded the General Depot and was placed in direct supervisory control of my Air Resupply Unit by Maj. Gen. Tunner, USAF. At the time of our arrival, air drops were being made from C-47 type aircraft carrying a payload of 4,000 pounds and utilizing ATTC personnel for cargo ejection. Cargo losses had been as high as 50 percent, due to their inexperience and lack of airdrop training. During this operation my unit was utilized for the labor involved in handling freight, which I believed to be misuse of highly trained aerial-delivery personnel. Since one of the important reasons for our being in FECOM was to support the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, due to the non-availability of the Divisional QM units, I felt that valuable time was being lost by the misuse of my people as stevedores on freight loading, and that this time could very well be spent in bringing the unit to a training level that would enable us to perform our assigned mission with maximum efficiency. I therefore contacted the office of the Theater Quartermaster and my mission was clarified in accordance with the original assignment. On September 23rd the Airborne Combat Team arrived and we were detached from control of the ATTC and placed under command of Colonel (now Brigadier General) Bowen. The mission of this Combat Team had been changed, and it was to be immediately air-lifted from Japan to Kimpo Air Field at Seoul. In order to accomplish this objective it was necessary that the unit be on outloaded on the afternoon of its day of arrival. In passing it is interesting to note that the Second Battalion of this Airborne Regiment was in contact with the enemy in Korea within twenty-four hours after its arrival at the Air Base; the entire Combat Team had engaged the enemy within three days after its arrival. Later in the planning stages of the Airborne drop scheduled for north of Pyongyang, it was evident that full realization of the capabilities of dropping heavy equipment and aerial resupply was lacking. This can be attributed to the newness of heavy-drop technique and perhaps to the association of aerial resupply with the obsolete and outmoded World War II techniques. It was noticeable also, in ground units, that there was a complete lack of understanding of aerial drop capabilities. This was evident, insofar as the Airborne phase was concerned, in that firm commitments as to the equipment to be dropped and the supplies needed for aerial delivery phases were changed many times up to and including the last 24-hour period prior to actual drop. Three weeks later we prepared the support for the parachute combat drop in Sukehon and Sonchon, North Korea. We were given a 48-hour notice prior to D-day; however this was cut to twenty-four hours, and aircraft were made available accordingly. This 24-hour step-up gave us numerous headaches insofar as operational organization was concerned, making it difficult to meet the D-day commitment of 20 October 1950. Equipment and supplies to be dropped consisted of 3/4-ton trucks; 90-mm. anti-tank weapons; 1/4-ton trucks; 105-mm. howitzers; M-55 anti-aircraft multiple mounts; l/4on trailers; 6,000-lb. load-bearing platforms; the normal supplies of gasoline and water; 105 and 90-mm., .30, .45, and .50 calibre ammunition; grenades of various types; 3.5 rockets; signal and medical supplies, and rations. We were well aware of the likelihood of losing perhaps all of our parachutes and allied equipment. This would be most expensive in critical materiel and money. The importance that we attached to the recovery of these items was directly proportional to the non-availability of those items for replacement, either from the ZI or from the Theater. Particularly in view of the fact that a single T-7 personnel parachute costs $265 and that large cargo parachutes cost $2,200 apiece, it was decided that we would send a recovery platoon into the drop area on D+1, tactical situation permitting, to recover all personnel parachutes and allied equipment, and all heavy-drop parachutes and allied equipment. I designated one officer and thirty men for this task, fifteen from the 2348th and fifteen from a Quartermaster Parachute Maintenance Company. We were able to recover 80 per cent of all personnel parachutes dropped in the Airborne operation, and the bulk of the heavy-drop equipment. This represented a very substantial monetary saving, not to mention the value of on-the-spot availability of this equipment in maintaining the striking capability of the combat units for future operations. The losses that were incurred can be traced directly to the lack of supply discipline on the part of using Airborne troops. A specific example of this poor discipline was evident in the fact that personnel had cut parts of the parachutes to use for souvenirs and scarves, and that in detaching the heavy-drop equipment from the platforms they had cut both tie-down and suspension webbing rather than using quick release attachments provided for that purpose. The loss of even one part of the suspension or tie-down systems rendered this very expensive and very critical kit useless. On the 25th of October we received orders from Eighth Army detaching us from the 187th Airborne RCT and attaching us to the combat cargo command in southern Japan. Upon my return to that base I found that the ATTC Unit had been absorbed by the Transportation Corps Aerial Port of Embarkation and that an entirely new procedure in aerial-drop and air-freight was in operation. We thus provided aerial-drop support from this base to all units in the combat operation in Korea, including the 1st Cavalry Division, the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, various ROK units, the Marines, and even the Navy, as well as the various other UN units in the combat area. On the 29th of November we received a very large commitment for air-drop supply to the Marines in the Chosen Reservoir area. Some 1,571 tons of supplies were dropped during this phase. We supported the operation from two air bases: southern Japan, where the major effort was being made, and Yon-Po, just outside of Hungnam port. At Yon-Po we found that the Marines had an aerial delivery platoon which was supporting their smaller cut-off units with C-47 type aircraft. Since they lacked the technical knowledge to utilize the C-119 type aircraft, it was necessary that I send eleven men to that area to assist and train the Marines in making aerial drops from 119's. We had, at this time some eighty Quartermaster enlisted men available in the 2348th QM, and it was evident that we would need assistance if we were to provide a continuous airlift in large quantities. In passing it is interesting to note that we dropped some 265 tons during the first day of the operation, utilizing only the available eighty enlisted men and one hundred Japanese. Upon receipt of an untrained assortment of soldiers, airmen, and Japanese civilians, our total air-resupply force was bolstered to 645 men. Despite this impressive augmentation, however, we did not at any time after their arrival deliver more than 250 tons in a given day. This, again, demonstrates the futility and waste of manpower incident to emergency "beefing up" of a highly skilled unit with untrained bodies. It is simply not possible to organize and train new personnel in this complicated technique in the short time allowed. However, the training of additional men did pay off, as indicated by an upward trend of tonnages, but then the requirement was over. We had one accident in this operation. We had attempted to train additional aerial-delivery men to eject the load from the aircraft and one of the men given that responsibility made an error in releasing the load and lost not only the load but himself, at 8,000 feet altitude, south of the Chosen Reservoir. He landed in enemy territory. He had lost his weapons, and his helmet, but did, however, manage to walk out and return to Yon-Po Air Base the next day, catching the aircraft that he had fallen out of back to Japan. I mention this particular phase for one reason only-to show the necessity for trained personnel. An important phase of the Marine operation was the dropping of the M-2 Treadway Bridge. As stated earlier in this article, we had placed eleven men of my unit in the Yon-Po area and they were under the command of the Air Force Commander of that base. My sergeant in charge of the QM Detachment was directed to rig and test-drop a section of the M-2 Treadway Bridge by means of G-1 type parachutes, which are 24 feet in diameter. It was dropped, and succeeded in burying itself twenty feet underground. We immediately received a flash from the Yon-Po area which indicated that I was to proceed there and bring the necessary equipment to drop a bridge. They didn't say what kind of bridge nor did they give any description as to size or weight. As far as we knew it could have been the Brooklyn Bridge! However we did not have time to query them, and left with equipment we thought could be used to drop any size bridge that would fit inside the C-119 type aircraft. We found, upon arrival at the Yon-Po airstrip, that it was an M-2 Treadway Bridge, and that each section weighed 4,500 pounds, was approximately 18 feet long, and 71/2 feet wide. We decided to attach not the large G-11 parachute but the G-5 48-foot nylon parachute to each end of each section and to drop it by means of gravity drop. By gravity drop we mean that an object is allowed to roll out of the aircraft by means of rollers placed on the floor, the parachutes being actuated by static lines attached to the aircraft itself. Procedures utilized in dropping this load differed from any procedure that we had used prior to this operation. In order that we might hit a 300-yard drop zone it was decided that we would untie the load once we were airborne (1,000 feet), push it back some seven to eight feet so that it would be extended over the rear edge of the aircraft floor, then re-tie it. This would mean that, upon arrival at the drop zone, we could cut down ejection time from four seconds to one second, giving us at least a 200-yard margin to work with on the ground. Eight sections were dropped and all were recovered on the ground and used. The bridge was needed by the Marines to cross a deep ravine southwest of the Chosen Reservoir, to reduce, by thirty-five miles, the distance they were required to travel in their withdrawal. We later assisted the withdrawal of the Marines for three days in outloading the final 5,000 tons of supplies from the Yon-Po area. These elements of the 2348th QM Unit left with the last aircraft leaving the airstrip, after destroying a C-47 and a C-119 that could not be started. The only other units remaining in the area were the demolition teams which were moving out to the Hungnam area. We were handicapped by the lack of adequate supplies of webbing, hardware, and other items needed to support an aerial delivery unit. However, we used rope as a substitute, some 1,365,000 feet being used in the Marine operation alone, along with 10,765 G-1, 24-foot, 300-pound-capacity parachutes, 385 G-5, 48-foot parachutes capable of carrying 3,000 pounds each, and 2,762 G-9, 18-foot parachutes with a 200-pound capacity. No procedures or doctrine for the operations of an aerial depot had been established. Had I had at my disposal the aerial depot organizational operational techniques being developed in The Quartermaster General's Office, the difficulties involved for all concerned would have been vastly reduced. As it was, we found in Korea and in Japan a confusing and conflicting overlap of responsibilities. The Air Force, Transportation Corps, and our Aerial Delivery QM Unit, were all involved in the operation of the aerial depot. The Air Force commanded the Air Departure Combat Command, giving the orders and placing commitments upon the Transportation Corps. The Transportation Corps operated a small depot to provide a level of supplies for aerial freight and air-drop delivery. Lacking personnel experienced in depot operations, they were at a most serious disadvantage, particularly in techniques of stock record and locator systems. For this reason we could never be sure that we could secure supplies to meet emergency demands, and this uncertainty slowed down operations accordingly. I believe that we should employ the regular depot system, insofar as possible, utilizing the trained air supply personnel of the Aerial Delivery units. The depot commander should receive the emergency delivery demands from the appropriate authority and, in turn, make request for movements of air freight on the Transportation Corps and direct the QM Aerial Delivery Unit to accomplish air-drop operations. Coordination between Army and Air Force to match air-lift with air-supply requirements is a movement-control responsibility. Consideration should be given to the pin-pointing of aerial delivery depots on U.S. air bases throughout the world. These aerial delivery depots, I believe, should be set up with aircraft loading platforms. Temporary stationary platforms could be built now, and in possible future operations could be utilized and would make for a much more efficient operation, in view of the fact that we would back the aircraft up to the loading platform or drive it alongside, using a conveyor system to load, thereby cutting out the turn-around time of forklifts and trucks. Aerial delivery increases the speed and flexibility available to the commander for tactical operations. It circumvents fixed defenses and natural obstacles, delivering equipment and supplies to areas inaccessible by normal supply routes. It provides the means by which the tactical commander can maintain full combat efficiency of units, whether isolated or normally displaced, thereby increasing the scope of operation of our armed forces. Limitations are those dictated by capabilities of existing aircraft, and the cost in materials. Heavy-drop and aerial resupply techniques offer great tactical and logistical advantage in all types of army operations. Terrain obstacles do not present serious problems in aerial delivery. Obstacles of distance and time involved in logistical support are more easily surmounted. Potentials which can be enlarged upon include such action as: A method of accelerating the build-up of supplies for units in preparation for assault. Use of heavy-drop techniques in displacing heavy equipment forward in mountainous areas, eliminating the necessity of expending machines and manpower to displace weapons forward under such adverse conditions. Maintenance of supply units which have outrun normal supply lines in the assault, thereby exploiting any tactical advantage gained. Support of special mission units, such as hard-hitting, fast-moving recon units. Re-equipping units which, in becoming isolated, lost part or all of the heavy weapons and vehicles needed to maintain full combat effectiveness. Dropping of certain engineer units to build or repair airstrips. It is vital that the Army organize, operate, and control its own air resupply and heavy-drop units because of the ground combat implications stemming from the increased tactical flexibility incident to air resupply and heavy-drop support; the necessity of placing at the disposal of the ground combat commander control of the means for accomplishing his mission; and predominant requirement for Army-type items (ammunition, etc.) generally not common to any other Service. One school of thought that is contrary to this belief is that assault aircraft and helicopters will be available and could be utilized for such operations. This, I think, overlooks the fact that suitable landing areas can be defended against assault-type aircraft by merely putting man-made aircraft barriers on the field. Also, assault aircraft and helicopters are vulnerable to enemy ground fire. There is, to my knowledge, no defense against the parachute. Once the equipment is in the air, there is nothing that you can do to deter it from its line of drop. The various capabilities that I have outlined are just a few of the many possibilities for this type unit. There is little need of losing large quantities of valuable and costly parachutes and equipment by air-drop. I think that it is possible to reduce parachute losses to 10 per cent if proper recovery procedures are instituted. The Quartermaster Corps has embarked on a new and bold mission of logistics. We have successfully accomplished our mission in Korea in this regard and we look forward with confidence to the tactical flexibility we will provide the commanders of the armed forces in the future. LOGISTICS BY PARACHUTE By Capt. Cecil W. Hospelhorn, QMC Publication and Date Unknown
Logistical support of our armed forces is perhaps the most important single aspect of war. There are many methods by which we furnish logistical support: man himself, pack animals, truck, rail, boat or ship, aircraft-all are common carriers. The Korean conflict presented perhaps the most difficult problem in logistics that our armed forces have ever faced. The lack of road network. railway facilities, waterways, airfields; coupled with the elements-snow, rain, floods, and mud-aggravated by mountainous terrain, taxed our logistical experts to the limit in their endeavors to overcome such obstacles. Into this nest of unique logistical stumbling blocks was injected logistical support by parachute. Korea was to become the scene of aerial supply activities on such a scale as the world had never before witnessed. The aircraft didn't have to wade the rivers, churn in the mud, climb the mountains or fight the snow to deliver supplies and equipment, ranging from one pound of grease to a 9,000-pound gun. On 7 December 1950, perhaps the greatest single feat of aerial supply in the history of warfare was achieved. Certainly the importance, on that date, of aerial supply to the 1st U. S. Marine division and elements of the 7th U. S. Army Division does not need magnification to put it into the right perspective. An M-2 treadway bridge was parachuted to these units in the Chosin Reservoir area of North Korea. The Chinese Communist horde had completely encircled the Chosin Reservoir area, blocking the movement of the soldiers and Marines in their effort to reach Hungnam port. The route over which the movement to the port was to be made was rendered impassable by the Chinese Reds, who demolished part of the mountainous road. The point where the road was demolished offered the engineers a problem of such magnitude that the time element would not permit an extended period for blasting the vertical walls to cut a new roadbed, nor time to drill into the base of the vertical drop-off to provide footings for a timber trestle. A ready-made bridge was needed, and all routes were blocked except by air. Airstrips were not suitable for landing heavy aircraft within the perimeter. Parachutes would have to suffice. If the bridge could not be dropped. other alternatives were to spike the guns, roll both guns and vehicles over the side of the mountain and walk out; or choose a more circuitous route through the Chinese hordes. Either choice would have resulted in the killing or wounding of many more. Annihilation was not a remote possibility. On this December day. soldiers and Marines who could spare a moment in the fighting to look up, saw eight C-119 aircraft circling the vicinity,- of Koto-ri. They could see the large 4,500-lb bridge sections being ejected from each aircraft, and the huge white parachutes catch air and deploy. 'Their route of escape was now a certainty. As company commander of the Quartermaster Airborne Air Supply and Packaging Company, 8081st Army Unit, I received the request for the bridge drop. The message, received the night of 6 December 1950, stated that a bridge had to be dropped; and directed me to proceed to the Yon-po airstrip, North Korea, with the necessary men and equipment to accomplish the mission. We had no idea as to the type bridge to be dropped, but were confident that if it would fit inside the C-119 we could drop it. Without dwelling on anticipated complications we gathered together parachutes and allied equipment, and were on our way by air in less than two hours after receipt of the message. I had dispatched 11 Quartermaster Aerial Delivery men to the Yin-po airstrip several days earlier to instruct the Marines in the use of the C-119 Those 11, plus the three I took with me, would make available 16 of us and, if need be, we could get additional manpower from the Marines to assist in loading. Upon arrival at the Yon-po airstrip I found theca bridge to be an M-2 treadway in eight sections. To each of the sections we attached two G-5 (48 feet in diameter) parachutes. This was to be a gravity drop. Rollers on the floor of the aircraft would provide the base on which the bridge sections would roll out of the aircraft. These sections were some 18 feet long and 7 ½ feet wide. The drop zone was reported to be only 300 yards long. In view of this small area, each Quartermaster Dropmaster was instructed, once airborne, at 1,000 feet to untie the bridge, move it back until eight feet protruded from the rear of the aircraft, and then re-lash it in place. By this method, we hoped to cut down the ejection time from four seconds to less than two. We found he drop zone to be much larger than the anticipated 300 yards. Each of the eight C-119s, flying in trail, delivered its bridge section on target. We all breathed a sigh of relief when the final report came from the ground, stating that all sections were usable. That night the Marines were rolling out over the first bridge ever to be dropped by parachute in the history of warfare. The soldiers and Marines were coming out riding vehicles powered by gasoline that had been dropped by parachute. Rations, ammunition, clothing, medical supplies and weapons, making a total of 1,597 tons, parachuted into this area from 29 November 1950 to 9 December 1950. The C-119, parachutes, pilots and aerial delivery technicians thus provided necessary assistance to more than 20,000 men, including equipment, supplies and vehicles. Aerial supply is considered by many to be the emergency aspect of logistical support, rather than a sound well-thought-out plan to put supplies on an express basis. Aerial supply is the means by which we augment and extend so-called normal supply routes. The potential of our forces can be increased by lending the inherent flexibility of aerial supply to those needs. We can reach the tactical commander in the most inaccessible areas. He need not then pass up, or delay, any tactical advantage he might have in the fear that he might be severing his supply-line. We can support his patrols or raiding parties back of enemy lines. His motorized recon units can be maintained at full combat effectiveness without fear of being stranded. Vehicle ranging from quarter-ton trucks to 2½-ton cargo and dump trucks, artillery pieces. from 105mm howitzers to 155mm howitzers, tractors from D-1 to D-4, road scrapers, graders, ammunition, rations, gasoline and medical supplies are just a few items of the vast potential that he may depend upon to assist him in his mission. Every ground commander does not then, necessarily have to be airborne in order to employ some of the basic concepts of vertical envelopment. The Korean theater saw, for the first time, the employment of an Airborne regimental combat team (187th) taking in with it, on the assault phase-by parachute-nearly- all of its full TO&E allotment of vehicles and artillery- pieces. For the first time in the history of warfare, an Airborne unit could fight on practically even terms with enemy units, insofar as artillery was concerned. This Airborne combat- team was the recipient of some 1,313 tons of supplies by parachute, in addition to the air delivery of its vehicles and artillery pieces. During a period of about one year, in 1950-51, more than 18,000 tons of supplies and equipment were parachuted to members of the U. N. forces. Tonnage dropped to forces other than airborne was in excess of 15,000 tons. To accomplish the mission of aerial supply, more than 11,000,000 feet of rope, 37,000 sheets of 4- x 8-foot plywood and 140,000 parachutes, of all types, were used. Hawser rope to the Navy, sandbags to the amphibious forces, gasoline to Air Force helicopters, shoes to the South Koreans, enough barbed wire to encircle the world, or so we thought, comprised part of our mission at one time or another. All major units were cognizant of the value of aerial supply-in the Korean theater. The U. S. 10th Corps received most a continuous stream of supplies by parachute from 2 January 1951 to 16 February 1951. Due to the lack of adequate roads it was necessary that air-landed supplies, and supplies by parachute, both be used to augment the Corps' normal supply routes. This augmentation was necessary both in the defense of the Corps sector and to speed the build-up of supplies necessary to launch an attack northward. The 1st Cavalry, 2nd Infantry, 3rd Infantry, 7th Infantry, 24th Infantry, 25th Infantry -- all U. S. Army Divisions-separate U. S. Regiments. as well as forces from our allies, found it necessary to call for supplies by parachute and airlanding. The 8th U. S. Army in Korea was, and is now, supported by one Quartermaster Aerial Supply Company. This aerial supply company, activated on 31 July 1950, was the Quartermaster General's answer to the expressed need of the Army to have the means by which the logistical arm could be extended. Its mission was to receive, temporarily store and package for air drop, supplies and equipment from all services; to maintain and pack parachutes of all types, and attach the parachutes to the packaged supplies to load and lash equipment and supplies in the aircraft, fly with the supplies; to perform ejection of these supplies over the drop zone. Quartermaster personnel also would be parachuted into drop zones to assist in recovery procedures. This all-inclusive mission covered the phases of aerial supply vitally concerned with logistical support of our ground forces. This first Quartermaster aerial sup ply company was on the way to the Far East theater 15 days after activation. The rated capability of the company was given as the aerial delivery of 50 tons a day. We were to find, however, the requirements were heavier, and that the capabilities of the company would have to be, and were, increased by the use of indigenous personnel. The maximum tonnage delivered in one day was 388. The total tonnage is more impressive when the techniques and methods used in preparation, loading and ejection are taken into consideration. During 1950-51, the use of heavy containers such as the A22 (2,200 capacity) was not possible, because this container was new, and had not vet been injected into the supply channels in quantities that we desired. In fact, the only A-22's we bad, then, were of the local manufacture variety. These were exhausted very quickly on the first assault in support of the 187th Airborne RCT. Rope and small "A" series containers of the 300-pound capacity- type were our mainstays at that time. The containers coupled with the parachutes available, G-1's (24 feet in diameter) and C-9's (18 feet) dictated the necessity of devising a method by which we could deliver in excess of 5 to 6 tons from the C-119 in a matter of a few seconds. To accomplish this, we first cut plywood into four foot squares. On these squares we placed from four to six 300-pound bundles. Each bundle had its own staticline-activated parachute. This then gave us a gravity system of ejection, as effective as the A-22 gravity ejection with the exception of ground dispersion and malfunction rate. The ground dispersion we couldn’t do much about, but the malfunction rate was manageable. From each aircraft we would drop many as 50 to 102 parachutes. In doing this, over-saturation of the air was our enemy. This over-saturation was somewhat eliminated by daisy chaining bundles, a method by which we attached bundles together, allowing the parachute on the first bundles going out to act as an anchor for the opening of succeeding parachutes. This worked very well, as evidenced by the decrease of malfunctions from three bundles in 50 to less than one per 50. We moved the anchor line cable from the floor during this period and placed it along the top of the fuselage, anchoring one end to the forward bulkhead and the other to a clevis on the monorail. The balling-up of some 50 to 100 static lines on the floor made this necessary, because the movement of plywood on the rollers would otherwise have been hampered. The method of releasing the entire load, once over the drop zone, was at first crude, but fairly effective. We used a retaining web, or rope, around the load, and, when we desired to release, we cut the web or rope, around the load to roll out the rear. In the meantime a search was pressed for a better method. Many were tried, but the one finally selected was the B-1 bomb shackle. To use the bomb shackle required only two pieces of type 10' nylon webbing . This webbing was secured to a tie-down ring on one side, at the rear of the aircraft, and across the rear of the load, to be attached to the bomb shackle. This actually formed a gate which could be opened by disengaging the webs from the bomb shackle. This method was very effective. We liked it for two reasons, one was its simplicity in installation and the other was that it could be re-used over and over. It always stayed with the aircraft. Although this method had been tried before at Field Forces Board No.1, it was improved by my maintenance Sergeant, and became, I think, one of the best release methods for gravity drop today. All gravity-type drops were performed at actual altitudes of 800 feet. It was necessary, however, in many instances to drop from higher altitudes because terrain features were such that low-level flying was not conducive to long life of either the aircraft or personnel riding it. Ground fire from enemy troops was never intense. We can well assume however, that ground fire in future wars may he more intense. This brings up one important aspect as pertains to parachutes. I believe we could use a delayed opening type parachute to good advantage in aerial delivery of supplies. The delayed opening type parachute, coupled with some type of sighting mechanism in the aircraft, would make it possible for aerial supplies to be received from any altitude with bomblike precision. This same parachute could be dropped through overcast skies, or at night,. from altitudes safe for aircraft maneuvering. This type parachute used in conjunction with a device making it possible for the pilot to hit a drop zone even though the zone be obscured by weather, smoke or darkness-would enhance the survival of ground troops. The gravity-drop system has one other aspect which bears some discussion. The speed of ejection of gravity type loads is dictated by the flying attitude, or jump attitude, of the aircraft. This jump attitude is the flying characteristic of the C-119 at approximately 110 knots, at which time the aircraft is flying slightly tail down. This gives the floor a natural incline, down which the supplies can roll. It can readily be seen, then, that the greater the degree of incline the faster the supplies roll out. If flying level, or descending, the supplies will move out very slowly-, or not at all, this latter being the case when descending. A positive method for ejection is needed. Some type of floor booster probably would be satisfactory. The release system should be of a type that remains with the aircraft, allowing for re-use, and thus consuming less time in reinstalling release systems after each aerial supply drop. The Quartermaster Aerial Delivery technicians flew in excess of 3000 sorties, averaging more than 30 missions per man in the unit. The development of drop techniques was further advanced because these technicians were personally able to eject the cargo and observe the drop. Many times, rigging and parachutes were in need of corrective action during flight. The parachute rigger was there to take such action. Any delay or malfunction in the ejection sequence was immediately corrected, primarily because of the traditional unconcern of paratroopers for the open end of an aircraft. Having complete confidence in himself and his parachute enabled him to complete any necessary details on the very edge of the door. Interrogation sheets filled out on completion of the mission enabled the Company Commander to adjust the ground rigging, parachute packing and loading problems involved in making the drop successful. The observance of the actual drop by an experienced parachute rigger is invaluable in further perfecting aerial delivery techniques. The trend in aerial delivery techniques today is toward semi-automatic or automatic ejection of cargo and equipment from the aircraft. The basic element which makes the margin of success in any aerial delivery operation, however, is the parachute rigger. We have completed, at least for the time being, a thorough test for aerial delivery in its combat role. Its success was dependent upon the skill of the pilots who flew the aircraft, the knowledge of the Quartermaster aerial delivery technician, and the ability of our civilian workers and technicians to produce an aircraft capable of such brilliant performance in combat areas. Thousands of U. N. soldiers today owe their lives to the fact that aerial delivery was available when it was needed, where it was needed and in the right quantities. From the Archives of the U.S. Army Quartermaster Museum, Fort Lee, Virginia
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